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On its surface, Athina Rachel Tsangari’s Chevalier (2015) offers a commentary on 
contemporary masculinity, for the game called ‘Chevalier’ that the men in the film play 
is designed to show who is the ‘best’ man of them all. Writing in Sight and Sound, for 
example, Adam Nayman called the film a ‘witty, affectionate satire of contemporary 
masculinity’ (Nayman 2016, 32), while Violet Lucca in Film Comment claimed that the 
film was ‘about male characters who obsess over the minutiae of their behavior and 
bodies’ (Lucca 2016, 67). That Chevalier offers a humorous portrayal of contemporary 
masculinity is clear, but I want to argue that, even in its attempts to avoid it, the film 
cannot help raising the spectre of the recent Greek financial crisis. Tsangari has very 
strongly resisted such readings. ‘The Greek crisis’, she has claimed, ‘is becoming a sort 
of fetishistic, exportable commodity for artists …. It’s as if we as filmmakers are 
expected to be actively exporting a product, and that product is the national tragedy of 
Greece’ (in Nayman 2016, 34). Nevertheless, against Tsangari’s wishes, the crisis is, in 
fact, of utmost importance to the film. That is certainly what I argue here, adopting 
something akin to Fredric Jameson’s notion of ‘national allegory’ by affirming that the 
personal conflicts played out in Chevalier can be read as allegories of the contemporary 
Greek political and financial crisis (see Jameson 1986).1 My focus will not be entirely 
on Greece. Rather, I see the film as exploring the relationship between Greece and 
Europe, especially in the light of the strict economic austerity measures handed to 
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Greece by the European Union in concert with the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Central Bank – which together have come to be called the ‘Troika’ – in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Chevalier does something substantially different from other films associated with the 
recent Greek ‘weird wave’, as it has been called (see Psasos 2016). Chevalier does not 
offer what Rosalind Galt has called a ‘cinema of refusal’, which is to say that Chevalier 
does not refuse the hegemonic neoliberal order so as to posit an alternate or subversive 
‘other’ order that rejects current socio-political ideologies (such is Galt’s argument 
(Galt 2017)). What is at stake in Chevalier is a much broader set of ethical and political 
questions. And these questions are very broad indeed: How ought I to live? What kinds 
of behaviour are acceptable to a community of other people with whom one has to live? 
How can one cope with rules of life that are not determined by oneself but are instead 
imposed on oneself? Rather than refuse or default on the kinds of rules handed to them, 
Chevalier’s characters try to figure out how to work with those rules, that is, the rules of 
the game called Chevalier, in order to fathom how well, or how badly, those rules work. 
 
My argument will assess a range of issues. These issues are primarily guided by a 
specific political perspective framed by political philosopher Étienne Balibar. Balibar 
has argued for many years of the benefits and challenges of European community and 
union, as well as providing some insightful comments on the recent Greek crisis. His 
theories help to position Chevalier’s themes in a wider European context. 
 
 
Not a cinema of refusal 
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Chevalier is a comedy. It is certainly not a ‘political’ film, however such a thing may be 
defined. As I have already claimed, it does not stand as an example of what Galt calls a 
‘cinema of refusal’, or what at other times she calls a ‘default cinema’. Galt’s 
arguments, which deal with both European and other cinemas, as well as recent Greek 
cinema, posit a form of cinema that refuses outright the terms and ideologies of 
contemporary capitalism (Galt 2013, 2014, 2017). On European films, Galt claims to be 
attempting ‘to locate a cinematic form that could respond to the political question of 
Europe in the 21st century’ (2017, 11). She goes on to claim that ‘Austerity, debt, and 
precarity have become defining terms across the continent and beyond, intersecting the 
policies of the European Union with broader forces of globalization and the late-
capitalist ideologies that have come to be clustered under the name of neoliberalism’ 
(ibid., 11). The only appropriate cinematic response to the repressive regime of late-
capitalist neoliberalism, according to Galt, is a cinema of refusal: a cinema that refuses 
outright to play the game defined by the contemporary neoliberal hegemony. At one 
point she simply refers to this as ‘resisting the rules of the game’ (ibid., 11) and, in her 
article on recent Greek cinema, her argument places the Greek weird wave firmly in this 
bracket. What these films present, films like Lanthimos’ Dogtooth (2009) and The 
Lobster (2015), as well as Tsangari’s Attenberg (2010), are a search for something 
‘totally other to existing modes of living’ (ibid., 20). 
 
Galt’s position of refusal or default posits an alternative regime whose rules counter the 
current neoliberal hegemony. In cinematic terms this amounts to reiteration of what was 
once called ‘counter-cinema’, that is, cinematic alternatives that directly aim to counter 
dominant ideologies and forms (see Wollen 1985). I remain unconvinced by such 
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counter-strategies that posit an escape from the ‘system’ (see Solanas and Getino 1976, 
for example). Escape is also not what Chevalier proposes. Rather, Chevalier proposes a 
rethinking of the ‘rules of the game’ from the ground up rather than rejecting or 
escaping from those rules outright. This sort of approach requires, not a refusal, but a 
renegotiation and reconceptualisation of how things came to be the way they are. 
 
The kind of political approach I foster is one in which negation or refusal is not 
paramount. Trying to conceive of ways to construct a political community, of how to 
agree on what a community can call ‘good’, is foremost. A central question for such a 
perspective is how does one consent to living in a community? Allied to this is the 
problem of what one is to do if one does not consent to the rules of one’s community? 
Does one refuse those rules (Galt’s solution)? Does one try to change those rules? Or 
does one simply go along with those rules and do the best one can in the circumstances?  
 
These are questions central to any conception of politics, but alongside my reading of 
Chevalier, I focus on the ways that Balibar has approached questions such as these, 
especially in relation to the European Union. His responses boil down to one particular 
contention: that contemporary political trends in Western and European democracies 
have given rise to a situation in which individuals have less and less of a say in how 
their communities are run. Rules and laws are now made in ways that are divorced from 
the lives and interests of the individuals who are subject to those laws. Balibar began 
making this kind of argument in the mid-1990s, specifically reflecting on the emergence 
of the European Union (Balibar 2002c). 
 
The Judgment of the Community 
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One way Balibar conceives of this lack of participation in political decision-making is 
in terms of what he calls reflexive individualism. He means by this ‘the absolute right to 
judge oneself’ (Balibar 2017, 208). This means that individuals here assert their right to 
judge their own acts and decisions according to rules and laws they have made 
themselves. Reflexive individualism is not out-and-out individualism, for it is reflexive. 
This means that one’s judgments are never simply one’s own. Rather, as part of the 
process of self-judgment, the individual also ‘bears the community within himself’, as 
Balibar puts it (ibid.). In other words, my judgment is never solely my judgment, for any 
judgment all always be made in a social context. Balibar’s position is one in which self-
determination or the judgments one makes are never merely matters for a self to 
determine but are instead ones that a self makes only insofar as they are part of a 
community: they carry the community within themselves. These are, of course, 
founding problems of modern political philosophy and modern democracies, and in this 
context Balibar has written extensively on the British tradition of ‘possessive 
individualism’ (Hobbes, Locke, Mill), but he has also related that tradition to the 
writings of Fichte and Hegel, as well as linking these traditions to the rise of modern 
democracies, especially via conceptions of the ‘Rights of Man and Citizen’ (see Balibar 
1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 2013, 2014b). 
 
One of the reasons Balibar raises the issue of reflexive individualism is, first of all, to 
point out that these aspects can never entirely coincide: the judgments made by oneself 
and the judgment of the community will always be in tension (on a broader scale, 
Balibar refers to this as the proposition of ‘equaliberty’; 1994b, 2014a). Secondly, 
Balibar wants to ask how far in the direction of community such a process of judgment 
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can go before it loses all connection to ‘oneself’. If my judgment must also include a 
communal judgment, then how far towards communal judgment would it have to go to 
cease to be a judgment I could call ‘mine’? Balibar does not raise this question in order 
to answer it. Rather, he raises it so as to speculate that contemporary societies, certainly 
those of Europe, appear to have reached a point where the judgment of the community 
has overridden the judgment of the self: nowadays it appears that any self-judgment is 
pretty much deferred to communal authorities external to the self. Balibar makes this 
kind of assertion at a number of places, and stresses that something in the nature of 
reflexive individualism, as a founding concept of modernity, is on the verge of 
disappearing. And he does not believe this is a good thing. Balibar writes, ‘it seems that 
that technocratic and technological evolution of contemporary societies leads to the 
increasing expropriation of the judicial function and more generally of the citizen’s own 
capacity to judge’ (Balibar 2017, 211). The ability for any one individual to judge for 
herself or himself is increasingly being given over to experts, authorities, or 
technologies, and judgment is an activity that increasingly occurs outside the self, so 
that one now defers one’s own judgment to external authorities. 
 
More explicitly in relation to the policies of the European Union Balibar has asserted 
that ‘the decisions of the Community bodies … are not thought by the majority of the 
population in Europe as expressing common interests’ (Balibar 2013, 15). That is, the 
judgments made by the European parliament are rarely, if ever, based on a common 
consensus of the European people. Balibar makes similar claims specifically in relation 
to the Greek crisis. Speaking in 2010, he stated ‘The fact is that the purge, or the work 
of economic social measures and restrictions that are now placed on the Greek people 
on account of solving the debt problem, has been imposed in fact without any – without 
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the slightest – element of democratic discussion’. He adds, ‘These are purely 
technocratic measures’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2010, 308). In short, from Balibar’s 
perspective – and it is this perspective I will highlight – the Greek crisis demonstrates 
some of the ways that, in the contemporary political sphere, as exemplified by the 
policies of the European Union, the judgments of the community have come to outweigh 
the judgments of individuals, either at the level of actual citizens acting as part of the 
European community, or perhaps even more generally at the level of the individual 
nation-states: the mandates, votes and policies of individual nation-states like Greece 
are now by and large ineffectual and must instead be brought into line with 
‘technocratic’ decisions made in Brussels. The judgment of the community here 
overrides and renders ineffectual the judgments of individual nation-states, as so keenly 
noted in Yannis Varoufakis’ account of the negotiations undertaken by the Greek 





Tsangari’s Chevalier takes up these issues, that is, questions of who makes the rules of 
how to live, what kind of person should I be? or how ought I to act? The film finds its 
way to a point where none of the characters has the ability to judge for himself what a 
correct course of action is. What Chevalier foregrounds is that these characters find it 
impossible to determine for themselves as individuals what matters for them: acts of 
judgment are achieved only by appealing to external markers of ‘what one should do’ 
and of ‘how one should act’. In their search for meaning, these characters are not so 
much guided by themselves as they are guided by what they think others think they 
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should be doing. It is in this way that a logic of judgment as external to the self, a 
judgment that can no longer be located as internal to the subject, becomes a guiding 
ethos for the characters in the film. 
 
In the film, six Greek men who range in age from their mid-30s to their late 60s are 
holidaying on a luxurious private boat in a kind of ‘back to nature’ getaway. All of these 
men are friends and associates of one another. As events transpire, they decide to play a 
game on their way back to Athens. The rules of this game are essentially that all aspects 
of the men’s actions and attitudes will be scored and rated by the other men. The reason 
for scoring everyone’s actions and attitudes is to determine who is ‘the best in general’ 
as they put it – they want to know who is the ‘best man’ out of them all. 
 
Why do they play this game? A key scene occurs early in the film as the men are 
moored overnight as the boat continues on its return journey to Athens. The men play a 
game in which each of them tries to compare the others with an animal or object. 
Dimitris (Makis Papadimitriou) has suggested that Josef (Vangelis Mourikis) resembles 
a panda bear, but the other men don’t possibly see how he resembles a panda, for he is 
not large enough, and so on. But Dimitris counters these retorts by declaring that it does 
not matter what the other men think because this game refers here only to how Dimitris 
sees Josef: it is a game of subjective perception. Dimitris’s logic is clear: he argues that 
the game exists because there is no ‘common perception’; ‘It’s because there is no such 
common perception that the game even works’, he declares. In short, if there were a 
common perception, they would all agree that Josef resembles a panda, and that would 
be that, there would be no discussion or argument. Thus, for Dimitris, the game is a 
matter of each of them giving their own account of how they see things, and that is the 
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game. If everyone agreed, if there were a universal, common perception, there would be 
no need for the game. One of the men, Christos (Sakis Rouvas), counters this by stating 
that there has to be some agreement as to what counts, there cannot simply be a radical 
free-for-all in which anyone can make up their own rules. He argues that there really 
must be some sort of agreement, what he calls ‘common sense’: ‘I think there has to be 
consistency in terms of common sense. Let’s call it that: common sense.’ Dimitris 
disagrees and angrily asks ‘Are you going to censor what I see?’ 
 
The dilemma for the men here is therefore one of a conflict between judgment made by 
oneself and judgment made by the community; that is, the question at stake is: how does 
one person’s view of the world compare with others’ views of the world, and what can 
be done if there is a disagreement between subjective views of the world and so-called 
objective ones? How can there be such a thing as ‘common sense’? These are precisely 
the kinds of questions that pertain to the notions of politics and reflexive individualism I 
have pointed to: how can the judgment or action of one person square with the 
judgments and determinations of the group or community? This dilemma is played out 
in Chevalier as Dimitris and the other men try to consider how any one person’s 
subjective impressions can be related to shared perceptions, what these men call 
‘common sense’. Precisely how Chevalier goes about doing this is of great interest. The 
dilemma for Chevalier is to determine to what degree anyone’s subjective judgments 
can be trusted, and then, against this, to what degree the imposition of a set of objective 




How does Chevalier explore these issues? The men continue their game of comparisons 
until one of them suggests that Christos resembles a pineapple. He takes offence at this 
and then another of them, Yorgos (Panos Koronis), declares that he’s bored and no 
longer wants to play the game. In withdrawing from the game Yorgos says to Josef that 
just because he, Josef, is winning this game, that doesn’t make him a better man than 
Yorgos. It’s just a game. And Yorgos says this in a way that is meant to be intimidating: 
it is supposed to be a kind of threat or challenge. 
 
Christos then suggests they play a game called Chevalier. Christos explains the rules of 
this game: ‘Each of us thinks up a contest where we all compete. Anything you want. A 
physical test or a mental challenge. We each score each other. And he with the most 
points wins.’ The men are interested in this game, but then Yorgos ups the ante. He says 
he will be willing to play the game, but only if they change the game so that every 
single act and thing done by each of the men is scored; the game will not consist merely 
of chosen contests but rather will consist of everything: ‘Everything we do. How we 
speak … What words we use … How we laugh … How we look …’ and so on. Yorgos 
continues, ‘And whoever is the best at everything, he wears the chevalier’. The 
chevalier is a chevalier ring, to be worn by the winner. Yorgos wants to drive his point 





All of this is interesting as a fiction of masculinity – and indeed no women appear in the 
film, with the exception of conversations that occur by way of telephone or via internet 
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links. However, my claim is that, beneath this surface fiction of machismo and a crisis 
of masculinity, Chevalier is also a response to the Greek crisis. Most specifically the 
film can be seen as an allegory of the punitive economic measures imposed on Greece 
by the European Union in the years following 2008. I will not go into detail on what 
those measures were, other than to point to one commentator’s claims that the situation 
features ‘unprecedented austerity measures that have resulted in an explosive rise in 
unemployment and a corresponding deterioration in every aspect of people’s daily lives’ 
(Psaras 2016, 3). Here I want to identify more clearly the cultural relevance of these 
measures. To put it bluntly, the measures were seen as being something of an attack on 
the Greek way of life, on Greek practices and attitudes, in ways that were summed up 
by the charge that the Greeks are ‘lazy’. Thomas Piketty condensed all of this neatly by 
arguing that the Greeks were being punished by measures that equated to moral 
sanctions which were not, strictly speaking, economically motivated (Piketty 2016). 
Rather, they were moral sanctions based on the logic of household economics. The 
implication is that what was being meted out on Greece had more to do with inflicting a 
moral lesson than an economic one.2 In short – and this is where Chevalier can re-enter 
the picture – the Greeks were being told by the powerbrokers of the European Union 
that every aspect of their lives was now open to scrutiny, measurement and judgment. 
The free-spending, tax-avoiding ways of the Greek past must be reversed and every 
aspect of spending, as well as moral behaviour, must now be scrutinized and measured. 
This is the kind of atmosphere Chevalier is trying to evoke: the sense that every action 
of Greek life is now being monitored, and measured, subjected to a moral scorecard; 
these men are being judged on their behaviour, the way they act, the way they look, and 
so on. In short, what Chevalier portrays is a vision of the ways in which Greece itself 
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has become subject to scrutiny by the EU at every level of its existence. The personal 
fiction of Chevalier thus has relevance at the level of the political. 
 
There is another level at stake here too. In response to the Greek crisis, the terms of 
judgment, as we have seen Balibar claim, were not to be decided by the Greeks 
themselves. Indeed, the period from 2010-2015 was littered with attempted inputs and 
compromises from the Greek side all of which were rejected by the EU leadership. 
Instead, for Greece it was a matter of either accepting the rules laid down by the EU or 
of ceasing to be part of the EU altogether. We know now that Greece went with the 
former option, even when the left-wing Syriza party was elected to government in 2015 
with the specific goal of rejecting the EU’s mandates (see Varoufakis 2016, 2017; 
Clapp 2018). And all of this was occurring as Chevalier was in production. In the final 
account this means that Greece lacked any possibility of self-determination: it could no 
longer make its own judgments. Its destiny was out of its hands. The conditions of this 
kind of external determination are precisely the dilemma Chevalier is dramatising: it is 
charting what happens when one’s own destiny is taken out of one’s own hands. 
 
All of these issues are especially complicated for the Greek situation. Greek politics in 
the twentieth century is littered with compromises and interventions, especially the 
interventions of European powers following World War II. Greece’s ability to 
determine its own destiny has in so many ways been compromised (for an excellent 
summary see Clapp 2018). Add to this the arguments made my Marios Psasos that 
Greece has typically been weighed down by a strong patriarchal tradition: 
‘individualism and equal rights collapse in the face of a paternalistic construction that 
secures both the bodily and social survival of its subjects’ (Psasos 2016, 11). If 
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traditional patriarchy has been a burden, then European austerity acts as a reiteration of 
that burden. Where the tradition had placed the power of that burden with the father of 
the household, the post-2008 order sees that power shifted to the Troika. 
 
Chevalier dramatises this crisis at the level of the individual subject in precisely this 
way: at the level of discovering that everything any individual does will be subjected to 
a sort of technocratic scorecard, for this is what the game of Chevalier is all about. This 
is perhaps nowhere more evident than when Dimitris complains to the other men, ‘Are 
you going to censor what I see?’ And, verily, as the film progresses, this is exactly what 
transpires: the game of Chevalier means that every action, gesture, look and thought by 
any one man comes to be censored by all of the other men who pass judgment on 
everything that occurs: brushing one’s teeth, sleeping, what mobile phone ringtone one 
has, polishing silver, salad recipes, building IKEA shelves, and so on …. 
 
 
Demos and Ethnos 
 
If this is the case, if it can be declared that what is being depicted here is something akin  
the handing over of acts of judgment from individuals to the community, then how did 
things get to be this way? Balibar has for a long time been a keen observer of the 
European situation and the European Union especially. Most notable is his collection of 
essays published in France in 2001, We, the People of Europe (2004a), but he has 
continued to reflect on the destiny of Europe since then. One of the frameworks he uses 
in his analyses of Europe, alongside the rhetoric of reflexive individualism, entails a 
distinction between two political alternatives. The first is to advocate more democracy, 
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a kind of supra-democracy that would surpass and exceed the democratic traditions of 
nation-states. Balibar sees this approach, which he advocates under the ancient Greek 
term demos, as the only possible positive option for the European Union to take. To be 
politically successful, Europe must include more democracy than has ever been 
available to single nations. As he put it in the late 1990s, ‘European citizenship is 
“impossible” except as a progress in fundamental democratic rights and powers in the 
European “framework”’ (2004b, 162). He defends this in theory, but, over many years 
of writing, he has failed to see it in practice. As Balibar conceives of it, democratic 
rights and powers have declined over the period since 1992’s Maastricht Treaty for the 
simple fact that European citizens have little or no say in what goes on in the European 
Community: there is no ‘active citizenship’, Balibar argues, no sense in which European 
citizens have an active role in the processes of the EU and its parliament (Balibar 2013, 
14). Such a curtailing of democracy is nowhere more evident than in the Greek 
situation. Balibar, writing in 2013 on the Greek crisis, stated that ‘The current crisis [in 
Greece is one] which favours the increase in powers of a techno-structure without any 
direct legitimacy and of a minority of heads of state, with more or less diverging 
interests, negotiating with each other for compromises that are almost never submitted 
to the judgement of the mass of the people …’ (ibid., 14). 
 
Another option for the destiny of Europe, a negative and regressive option so far as 
Balibar conceives of it, is that whereby the citizens of Europe seek to define themselves 
in terms of ethnos rather than demos. Instead of more democracy, a turn to ethnos 
signals a return to traditional, national, ethnic interests. Balibar does not go so far to say 
that this is what has happened in the European nations, though he does note some of the 
tensions that have arisen in terms of ethnic nationalisms and what he calls ‘European 
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racism’. The chief cause once again, he argues, is a lack of active citizenship, the blunt 
fact that European citizens have little say in European policies. But a second reason for 
a turn to ethnos is the sense in which there has emerged a dividing line between what is 
‘properly’ European, and that which is not, a distinction between the European centre 
and its periphery (as one scholar claims, ‘the Eurozone has quite clearly become an area 
of structural generation of surpluses for core countries, Germany fundamentally among 
them, and deficits for the rest, primarily the periphery’; Lapavitsas et al. 2010, 293). 
Balibar had in fact already foreseen this kind of  division many years ago (in the early 
1990s) in terms of the ways that the EU had begun to operate on the basis of a ‘true 
Europe’ being distinguished from an ‘outer Europe’ (Balibar 2004b, 169). This 
distinction was originally one between the central European powers, chiefly France and 
Germany, and those of the post-Soviet bloc. Balibar wrote of the latter that it seemed, 
from the EU point of view, such countries were ‘not “mature” enough for democracy’ 
(ibid., 169). But now this is not merely a situation that involves Eastern Europe, as it is 
surely the case for Greece, for what has been applied in Greece amounts to a judgment 




The Staatsvolk and the Marktvolk 
 
Perhaps another perspective is necessary here. German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck 
has offered some penetrating analyses of Europe (and beyond) in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. As a consequence of arguments relating to the ways in which nations 
handle contemporary debt structures, Streeck argues that nation-states have to answer to 
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two conceptions of ‘the people’. These people are ostensibly the same people: we are 
not here talking about class divisions, for example, and Streeck’s distinction is not one 
between demos and ethnos. These people are instead conceived as representing different 
models of community and interaction. The first type of people is defined by national 
boundaries. Streeck calls them the Staatsvolk: the people of the nation-state. A second is 
defined by international markets: the Marktvolk; the ‘market people’. Streeck’s analysis, 
in ways that shadow Balibar’s arguments, attempts to describe the ways in which what 
were once national issues of taxing and spending, which governments had to address in 
order to provide for a population – a Staatsvolk – are now less clearly national issues. 
Rather, nowadays governments must also be answerable to international markets, and it 
is much less clear exactly how national governmental politics can deal with such 
transnational issues. One way to conceive of this is to admit that, when issues are played 
out at a national level, at least the government knows who it is dealing with, for it is 
dealing with its citizens, those citizens who, in contemporary democracies, have elected 
precisely those governments which represent them. By contrast, in political terms it is 
harder to know precisely what kind of contract pertains to the logic of the international 
markets, especially in their contemporary guises. For Streeck, global markets require 
investors rather than citizens, creditors rather than voters, functions by way of interest 
rates (or fiscal policy) rather than elections, and certainly has no obligations for the 
provision of public services and welfare, or the protection of citizens’ rights, and so on, 
these latter being central to what the modern nation-state and welfare state had provided 
(see Streeck 2014, 80-81). 
 
From this perspective, the stakes of politics are not merely those of negotiating a 
contract between an individual and a community. One of the key points Streeck makes, 
 17 
and he echoes many of Balibar’s statements here on the undemocratic nature of the 
European parliament, is that even though the European parliament is nominally elected, 
most of its deals and functions are carried out without any direct electoral responsibility. 
Streeck sums this up rather dramatically: 
 
The European consolidation state of the early twenty-first century is not a 
national but an international structure – a supra-state regime that regulates its 
participating nation-states, without a democratically accountable government but 
with a set of binding rules: through “governance” rather than government, so 
that democracy is tamed by markets instead of markets by democracy (Streeck 
2014, 116). 
 
All of this adds up to a perplexing picture of contemporary Europe in the context of 
international and multinational monetary flows. I think it is possible to assert that the 
political tide has certainly swung towards ethnos (in Balibar’s terms) and the Marktvolk 
(in Streeck’s terms), which in itself creates interesting scenarios of fallout. The chief 
fallout is a substantial weakening of democracy as such, as ever more political decisions 
are wrested from ‘the people’, so that decisions are now made by technocrats who must 
answer above all to international financial markets rather than any electorate. What this 
leads to is a clear fracturing of social bonds. If modern politics is conceived in terms of 
a negotiation between the individual and the community (reflexive individualism, in 
other words) and if, as I have argued, individuals and their voices are effectively taken 
out of the equation so that the community as an entity external to individuals comes to 
define what is, then the consequences are profound. Where governance usurps 
government, where technocrats usurp parliamentary representatives, and so on, one 
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consequence is that there can be little or no possibility for reflexive individualism, that 
is, there can no longer be any strong sense of a dialectic between the individual and the 
community. Instead, the consequence – paradoxically, perhaps – is one of out-and-out 
individualism: no longer is there the possibility of conversation and negotiation. Rather, 
what exists is a notion of pure competition, each to their own, with each individual 
doing his or her best to conform to technocratic rules of governance in an ongoing 
attempt to fit in with those rules (See Balibar 1991a, 25). 
 
And it is this attempt to conform to rules that Chevalier imparts by way of its game of 
Chevalier. A great deal of the film’s comedy emerges from the characters’ attempts to 
conform to the expectations of the other men – that is, all of their subjective actions are 
subjected to a stern ‘superego’ form of monitoring so that any one person’s actions are 
not determined by what they think but by what they think the others will think of their 
actions. Chevalier brings out the ludicrous nature of this kind of constant surveillance 
and scorekeeping. 
 
Inevitably the characters in Chevalier’s contests try to devise various ways of cheating 
or forming alliances with others so as to curry favour and garner extra points, all of this 
being part of the film’s logic of competitiveness. The point here is that, when rules are 
formulated in such a way as to be taken out of the hands of individuals, then various 
ways of trying to circumvent those rules becomes pervasive. Note that these are not 
ways of trying to resist those rules or create new rules – we do not have here a logic of 
what Galt calls default or refusal. Rather, these ways pursued in Chevalier are ways of 
breaking the rules while nevertheless ensuring those rules remain in place. Josef, for 
example, appeals to Christos at one point in the hope that he will support him: Christos 
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had failed to speak up for Josef when, as part of one of the contests (a rather crude 
‘penis measuring’ contest), Josef had been unable to sustain an erection. In an 
exceptionally nasty, sexist way, Josef brags about once having had sex in front of 
Christos in ways that, for him (Josef), clearly proved his manhood. But Christos had 
refused to bring up this incident in Josef’s support on the grounds that such a thing 
would contravene the rules of the game: his attempt at collusion fails. Another example 
of collusion: Dimitri and Yannis (Yorgos Pirpassopoulos) are brothers, so they are often 
seen negotiating in one way or another behind closed doors. And deals are struck 
between other pairings: for example, Yorgos has breathing difficulties when scuba 
diving with Christos one day, but Yorgos urges him to not tell any of the others on 
account of the fact that he would lose points. Later in the film, various men are seen 
trying to discover what kinds of scores they have received from the other men; Dimitris 
and Yorgos, for example, confer at one point, each declaring to the other that ‘I gave 
you high points’. All of this is the film’s way of declaring that no one can live freely in 
an atmosphere of total surveillance such as this. What invariably occurs are so many 
strategies of evading or undermining the surveillance processes, ways of trying to gain a 
strategic advantage. In terms of the politics on display here, then, the film is saying 
something like: these rules will not and cannot work. By analogy, the sense that the 
measures imposed on Greece by the EU will put an end to Greek corruption or tax 
dodging or ‘laziness’, is doomed to fail. Anyone subjected to this level of surveillance 
will find ways of countering and undermining it. In short, the kinds of measures being 
implemented by the EU are destined to fail. And this is indeed what seems to have 
transpired since the 2015 deal brokered by the Syriza government. One account, from 
2018, argues that the current city government of Athens fosters policies the point of 
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which ‘is not to streamline bureaucracy but to proliferate it, multiplying the 
opportunities at every level for favour-swapping and backhanders’ (Clapp 2018, 92). 
 
 
Tensions and Conflicts 
 
As the film progresses, tensions also emerge between many of the protagonists. 
Dimitris, for example, has spent a long time assembling a collection of pebbles 
throughout the journey, a collection he views with great pride and affection. So when 
Christos makes up a stone skimming contest whereby all the other men throw Dimitris’s 
pebbles into the sea, Dimitris is rightly upset. But in an atmosphere in which all self-
determination must be ceded to external authorities, Dimitris simply has to suffer the 
consequences, he cannot protest. 
 
The major cause of tension in the film is between the doctor (Yorgos Kendros) and his 
son-in-law, Yannis. The latter has not been entirely successful in his career as a life 
insurance salesman, and he feels his father-in-law judges him harshly in this regard. 
Furthermore Yannis has been unable to make his wife, Anna, the doctor’s daughter, 
pregnant. Thus, aspersions over his virility and manhood are cast. As if that were not 
enough, it emerges that Christos, the doctor’s assistant, and clearly someone the doctor 
likes a good deal more than his son-in-law, has been having an affair with Anna, and all 
of this is brought out into the open towards the end of the film. This issue is not 
resolved, which might be the film’s way of saying that, in amidst all the measures taken 
by the EU, there are still issues – call them ‘life’ issues, or human issues, the issues of 
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love and family and connectedness, as well as conflict – that are beyond the remit of EU 
measures to regulate. 
 
Chevalier thus reaches a point where the only question to ask is What is the point of the 
contest? What is the point of the rules of this game? And what is the point of 
determining who is the ‘best in general’? Any attempts to play by the rules, to succeed 
at being the best, have merely produced suspicion, dejection and conflict. The 
competition has certainly not brought out the brilliance of any of the men. Allegorically 
the same kind of conclusion can be asserted of the EU measures imposed on Greece: the 
levels of austerity prescribed can only feel like punishment (‘moral’ punishment), not 
measures that could bring out the best in Greek life. 
 
Chevalier also lacks resolution. There is a winner of the Chevalier game, but we do not 
see who the winner is. It simply doesn’t matter. What does matter are the reflections and 
behaviours that have emerged along the way. An important indicator of what the 
atmosphere of surveillance and competition produces comes to light near the film’s end. 
In a clear attempt to influence the scores, Yorgos suggests to the other men that they all 
become ‘blood brothers’. As he suggests this, he also slashes his hand with a knife in 
order to initiate the exchanges of blood. (Comically, none of the other men want to do 
such a thing – they are horrified! – until Dimitris finally agrees.) The key point is this: 
Yorgos declares that part of the rationale for their becoming blood brothers is to evoke 
the spirit and memory and the Greek Revolution of 1821, when Greece began the wars 
that would lead to its independence from the Ottoman Empire. This, therefore, is an 
appeal to Greek heritage, to Greek nationality and the bonds of Greek history and blood. 
What can this be other than an appeal to ethnos, as Balibar theorises it? This, then, 
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could be another outcome of the contest, as much as it could be an outcome of what the 
EU has imposed on Greece: an affirmation of national distinctiveness and ethnic 
heritage against the spirit of European Union and community. 
 
One response, therefore, to the restrictive rules posed by the game of Chevalier is that it 
will eventually see characters turn to a version of community inspired by ethnos rather 
than demos. This kind of ethnic renewal – Balibar goes so far as to call it ‘neo-racism’ – 
has haunted the European community for many years; Balibar’s first writings on it were 
during the 1980s (Balibar 1991a). And a turn to ethnos is certainly a real possibility for 
the nations of the European Union (one might claim that it has happened first of all in 
the United Kingdom and its 2016 decision to leave the EU). In many ways this is the 
option preferred by Streeck: only a return to the logic of nation-states and the 
accountability of governments, as signified by the notion of Staatsvolk, can act as a 
brake on the ever-expanding efficacy of the market and its production of the Marktvolk. 
Balibar is rather more in favour of the pursuit of a universalistic democracy: a principle 
of ‘Absolute civic equality’ must take precedence over nation-states in ways that mean 




Some Points of Conclusion 
 
The inconclusiveness of Chevalier’s ending is nevertheless optimistic. Each of the 
characters leaves the dock in Athens to which the boat has returned and they go their 
separate ways. What they have achieved is to have grappled with the ‘rules of the 
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game’, as it were. In that sense, each of the characters has engaged in activities that can 
be defined, in the end, in terms of reflexive individualism: they have subjected 
themselves to various rules of the community and have tried to excel in terms of the 
rules and judgments imposed by the community. But they have also found ways of 
questioning and potentially reformulating those rules. They do this by eventually 
discovering that the rules of the game do not matter. Matters of human relationships, of 
love and friendship, are not ones that can be sustained on the basis of prescriptive rules. 
They are matters that have to be negotiated, talked about, reflected on and acted on in 
ways that are active rather than passive. These are things that reflexive individuals can 
do. And these are things that matter, they go to the heart of questions outlined near the 
beginning of this article: How ought I to live? What kinds of rules are acceptable? Can I 
cope with rules that are not determined by myself? Ultimately – and this might be the 
lesson of Chevalier – these are aspects of a life that cannot be externally imposed. 
Rather, they are, under conditions of modernity, aspects of a life that must be 
negotiated; they are matters of trying out options, of making self-judgments at the same 
time as one also weighs up the judgments of others. 
 
Politically, the logic of such issues is simply that individuals must have more say in and 
more chances to reflect on their own positions within the communities in which they 
live. None of this involves default or refusal, as Galt terms them: it is not a matter of 
finding ways of living that are ‘totally other to existing modes of living’, as Galt argues 
(Galt 2017, 20). Politics should not be defined only by that which refuses, or says no or 
declares itself anti-. Rather, politics involves re-building and re-negotiating what is 
possible for societies, communities and individuals. These are issues that Balibar has 
been articulating for many years and Chevalier gives a sense of how such political 
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gestures might be conceived at the personal level. Chevalier, even as it exhibits some of 
the surrealist or absurdist characteristics associated with the Greek weird wave, does not 
advocate a politics of refusal. Reading into the politics of the film entails seeking a 
version of politics that is constructive rather than destructive. It necessitates 
understanding politics as a response to question like How did things get to be like this? 
and What steps can be taken to build a better set of social and political relations? 
Tsangari’s film does not deliver any conclusions or answers, but it does suggest that 
collective human voices engaged in processes of reflexive individualism might begin to 
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1  Jameson’s argument has certainly been criticised (see Ahmad 1987), but I adopt 
the stance taken by Ian Buchanan in his defence of Jameson’s arguments: that it is a 
crucial act of criticism to assert a relationship between the personal and the political (see 
Buchanan 2003). 
2  Peter Bratsis placed the whole situation in very bold terms by asking, ‘Why are 
the PIIGS [a demeaning acronym applied to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
in the wake of the 2008 crisis], like the Greeks, pigs? They are pigs because they cannot 
control their urges. They cannot refrain from immediate satisfaction’ (Lapavitsas et al. 
2010, 301). Bratsis is very critical of these kinds of associations being made in relation 
to the Greek people. 
                                                 
